2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
Business in the deputy corps of municipalities (exemplified by the Sverdlovsk region)
ru
Original Article|City: governance, communications, and local communities
AbstractFull textReferencesFilesAuthorsAltmetrics
Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin (19, Mira St., Ekaterinburg, 620002, Russian Federation)
Konstantin O. Serozeev
Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin (19, Mira St., Ekaterinburg, 620002, Russian Federation)
The purpose of the given article is to determine the representative bodies composition of municipalities and the place of the business community representatives in the deputy corps. The paper formulates research issues about the share of the business community representatives in the deputy corps; factors influencing the level of business representation in the city councils; whether the municipal deputies who come from business are a consolidated group and what it depends on.
The "state capture" concept, proposed by J. Helman, G. Johnson and D. Kaufman, the World Bank experts, made the theoretical and methodological framework of the article.
The empirical basis of the research was the biographical database of local deputies. The source of biographical information was the official websites of the representative bodies of the municipalities of the Sverdlovsk region. The total sample was 40 municipalities. The data source for municipalities was the official websites of local administrations. The list of monocities of the Middle Urals is provided on the official website of the regional Ministry of Investment and Development. The quantitative data analysis method was the statistical methods, including the multiple linear regression method. The statistical calculations were made with SPSS Statistics software.
It is shown that the commercial organizations representatives make up about 40% of the total number of municipal deputies. The author came to the conclusion that the economic development level of municipalities does not affect the representation degree of people from commercial structures. The paper notes that the presence of a city-forming enterprise in the municipality is a key factor. It is emphasized that neither an absolute majority of deputies-entrepreneurs, nor the mere presence of a city-forming enterprise is a guarantee of a city council "capture".
The "state capture" concept, proposed by J. Helman, G. Johnson and D. Kaufman, the World Bank experts, made the theoretical and methodological framework of the article.
The empirical basis of the research was the biographical database of local deputies. The source of biographical information was the official websites of the representative bodies of the municipalities of the Sverdlovsk region. The total sample was 40 municipalities. The data source for municipalities was the official websites of local administrations. The list of monocities of the Middle Urals is provided on the official website of the regional Ministry of Investment and Development. The quantitative data analysis method was the statistical methods, including the multiple linear regression method. The statistical calculations were made with SPSS Statistics software.
It is shown that the commercial organizations representatives make up about 40% of the total number of municipal deputies. The author came to the conclusion that the economic development level of municipalities does not affect the representation degree of people from commercial structures. The paper notes that the presence of a city-forming enterprise in the municipality is a key factor. It is emphasized that neither an absolute majority of deputies-entrepreneurs, nor the mere presence of a city-forming enterprise is a guarantee of a city council "capture".
Keywords: state capture, business, municipal deputies, city councils, municipalities
ГРНТИ: 06.35.51, 11.15.17
Article received: May 05, 2021
Article accepted: May 24, 2021
On the general principles of the organization of local self-government. Federal Law No. 131-FZ dated 06.10.2003. URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901876063.
Chirikova A.E., Ledyaev V.G., Seltser D.G. (2014). Power in the Small Russian city: configuration and interaction of the main actors, Polis. Political research, no. 2, pp. 88–105. DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2014.02.07.
Vitkovskaya T.B. (2015). Leisure in small towns of Perm Territory: Composition and level of competencies, Bulletin of the Perm University. Series: Political Science, no. 3, pp. 116–126. DOI: 10.17072/2218-1067-2015-3-116-126.
Hellman J.S., Jones G., Kaufmann D. (2000). Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. The World Bank. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23722386_Seize_the_State_Seize_the_Day_State_Capture_Corruption_and_Influence_in_Transition.
Lodge T. (2018). State capture: Conceptual considerations. In: Meirotti M., Masterson G. (eds.) State Capture in Africa: Old Threats, New Packaging. EISA. Pр. 13–28.
Stoyanov A. (2019). State Capture: from theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339214033_STATE_CAPTURE_FROM_THEORY_TO_PILOTING_A_MEASUREMENT_METHODOLOGY/citations.
Hellman J., Jones G., Kaufmann D. (2003). Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture and Influence in Transition Economies, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, рр. 751–773. DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.006.
Grzymala-Busse А. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 4-5, рр. 638–673. DOI: 10.1177/0010414007313118.
Begović B. (2005). Corruption, Lobbying and State Capture. CLDS Working Paper no. 0106.
Dal Bó E. (2006). Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 2, рр. 203–225. DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grj013.
Edwards D. (2017). Corruption and state capture under two regimes in Guyana, Working Paper, University of West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.
Southall R. (2018). What’s new about ‘state capture’? In: Meirotti M., Masterson G. (eds.) State Capture in Africa: Old Threats, New Packaging. EISA. Pр. 29–43.
Innes A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52, no. 1, рр. 88–104. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12079.
Tev D.V. (2017). State Duma of the Russian Federation of the Sixth Conversion: Socio-Professional Characteristics of Recruitment Basin, Power and Elite, vol. 4. Saint Petersburg. Intersocis. Pp. 76–154.
Electoral Code of the Sverdlovsk Region dated 23.04.2003 (in the last. ed.). URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/802002042.
Sakaeva M.M. (2012). Parliament as a “window of opportunity”: a study of the behavior of entrepreneurs with a deputy mandate in the implementation of market interests, Economic sociology, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 96–122.
Sakaeva M.M. (2014). Political participation of small businesses as a property protection strategy in Russian regions, Terra Economicus, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 152–161.
Filippova E.Yu., Ryabova O.A. (2018). City-forming enterprises in the political space of industrial cities of the Urals: Inclusion variability, Bulletin of the Perm Scientific Center of the Ural Branch os the RAS, no. 4, pp. 81–86.
Chirikova A.E., Ledyaev V.G., Ryabova O.A. (2020). Monocities of the Middle Urals: power, leadership, efficiency, Power and elite, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 123–162. DOI: 10.31119/pe.2020.7.1.5.
© Article. Ruslan S. Mukhametov, Konstantin O. Serozeev, 2021.