Introduction. The forest complex of Russia is a clear example of the incompatibility of established formal institutions with the preferences of economic agents. The conflict of endogenous and exogenous distribution gives rise to low economic efficiency. The correct adjustment of the institutions is possible only in conditions of compliance of the transformations with the requirements of economic agents and taking into account the influence of the "track effect". Thus, effective forest regions are characterized by a greater degree of compatibility of formal and informal institutions. The study of real market incentives of agents is possible in two ways: through the study of forms of resistance of agents to formal rules or, conversely, by studying the synergy of rules and preferences. The chain of institutional changes cannot be based solely on the elimination of the shortcomings of the system identified in the first way. The models of integration of institutions require empirical material based on the second stage of study.

Materials and methods. In this article, with the help of qualitative analysis and classification methods (modeling, synthesis, comparative and induction analysis), models of formal institutions (and, accordingly, indirectly institutions) of regions institutionally close to Russia (especially countries of continental law) with competitive forest industries are studied.

Results and conclusions. The boundaries of the formal model and the variables determining its character are indicated. Examples of different resource regimes and levels of ownership are considered, special attention is paid to the differentiation of state ownership of forests. The subjects of the industry regulators are specified, the classification by types of financing and functions performed is considered. Examples of relevant state forest policy instruments in the most relevant areas of development of the Russian forest complex are presented.

Discussion. It is shown that in a relatively inclusive institutional environment, state regulatory entities are individualized, and endogenous distribution is characterized by an increase in collective forms of participation. The key differences between the forest policy instruments of the designated environment from the formal institutions of Russia are a lower regulatory burden and another direction of stimulating mechanisms - forestry activities.

Keywords: forest complex, formal institutions, state enterprise, institutional transformations, forest ownership rights